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FUNDAMENTALS OF SECTION 1983
LITIGATION
Martin A. Schwartz'
Which is more important, major league baseball or Section
1983? Today, as the 2000 World Series begins, of course, the
answer is they are both important. It is the dream doubleheader,
Section 1983 by day, subway series by night. It is hard to resist
thinking about some of the Section 1983 issues that grow out of
New York City baseball: Is George Steinbrenner 3 a de facto New
York City policy maker? Are designated hitters a discrete and
insular minority? I am sure there are many excessive force issues
' Martin A. Schwartz is a professor of law at Touro College - Jacob D.
Fuchsberg Law Center. He also served as an adjunct professor of law at New
York Law School. Between 1968 - 1984 he was an attorney for Westchester
Legal Services. He is a member of the New York State Bar Association, and he
has argued three important civil rights cases before the United States Supreme
Court. Professor Schwartz is also the co-chair of the Practising Law Institute
annual program on Section 1983 litigation and co-chair of its annual Supreme
Court Review Program. He is a magna cum laude graduate of Brooklyn Law
School, and received his L.L.M. degree from the New York University School
of Law. He is the author of Section 1983: Claims and Defenses (3d ed. 1997),
Section 1983 Litigation: Federal Evidence (3d ed. 1999), co-author (with Hon.
George Pratt) of Section 1983 Litigation: Jury Instructions (1999), and
numerous articles on Section 1983 litigation. Professor Schwartz writes a bi-
monthly column for the New York Law Journal.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 2001). This section provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
See also IA, IB, IC MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (3d ed. 1997).
3 George Steinbrenner is the outspoken American business and sports
executive who became principal owner of the New York Yankees baseball team
in 1973. Steinbrenner is known for his strong ownership style and volatile
temper, which resulted in disagreements with players and managers that resulted
in frequent personnel changes-including hiring and firing the same manager,
Billy Martin, five separate times. Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2000
"Steinbrenner, George," at http://encarta.msn.com.
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surrounding the World Series. As tempting as it would be to
spend my time on these issues, let me turn to more pedestrian
questions. After all, that is my obligation today.
I. INTRODUCTION
My subject is the fundamentals of Section 1983 litigation. I
thought it might help to start with a fact pattern in a typical police
misconduct case. It is a fact pattern that I will come back to at
different points during my presentation. Let us assume that we
have a plaintiff, Paula Plaintiff, who was arrested. Paula claims
that the arresting officer used excessive force during the course of
the arrest, and she has asserted a claim for compensatory damages
against the police officer. She is also seeking punitive damages.
Let us assume that she asserted a claim against the municipality as
well. Note that although Paula can bring a claim against the
municipality for compensatory damages, municipalities remain
immune from punitive damages.5 Judge Calabresi of the Second
Circuit wrote a long opinion indicating that it may be time to
reconsider that issue.6 However, in this case Paula does not seek
punitive damages against the municipality. Let us assume that her
claim against the municipality is based upon a failure of the
municipality to train and supervise its police officers properly with
respect to the use of force in making arrests. It goes without
saying that the complaint would also assert a claim for attorney's
fees, and there might be supplemental state law claims as well.
4 See Buster Olney, Clemens Throws a Bat, Then Dominates the Mets, N.Y.
Times, October 23, 2000, at Al. In the second game of the 2000 World Series,
Roger Clemens, pitcher for the New York Yankees, threw a broken bat at Mike
Piaza, a New York Mets hitter. The Yankees went on to beat the Mets, 6-5.
5 Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (stating history and
public "policy do not support exposing a municipality to punitive damages for
the bad-faith actions of its officials").
6 See, e.g., Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 242 (2d. Cir.), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 933 (2000). In his concurring opinion, Second Circuit Judge
Calabresi wrote separately to suggest that the true purpose of Section 1983
would be better served by holding municipalities liable for punitive damages in
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II. ELEMENTS OF THE SECTION 1983 CLAIM
The first question to be confronted is: what are the elements
of Paula's Section 1983 claim for relief? If you look at the
Supreme Court decisional law, it is quite. consistent in articulating
two, and only two, elements that Paula must allege.7 She must
allege a violation of her federally protected rights, and that the
violation occurred under color of state law. 8 This description is
incomplete, however, because there are actually four elements of a
Section 1983 claim for relief, and in municipal liability cases, there
are five elements. Paula must first allege a deprivation of her
federally protected rights.9 Secondly, she has to allege causation
by satisfying a type of proximate cause requirement that is read
into Section 1983.10 As the third element she must allege that the
deprivation of her federal rights was caused by a "person.
11
Finally, she must allege that this person acted under color of state
law.12 Additionally, since Paula is also seeking to establish
municipal liability, she must also establish that the violation of her
federally protected rights was attributable to the enforcement of
some type of municipal policy or practice.13 I will address each of
7 See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (holding that to state a
course of action under Section 1983 a plaintiff is required to allege only that
some person deprived him of a federal right and such person acted under color
of state law).
s Id. See also American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50
(1999) (holding that to state a claim for relief in an action brought under Section
1983, plaintiffs must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the
constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged depriviation was
committed under color of state law).
9 See American Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 49-50.
1o See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 n.7 (1986) (holding Section 1983
recognizes the same causal link as common law tort liability); Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (holding that the language of Section 1983
imposes a proximate cause requirement on Section 1983 claims); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (stating Section 1983 litigation is interpreted
"against the background of tort liability that makes a[n individual] responsible
for the natural consequences of his actions").
1i See Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S.
658, 690 (1978) (holding Congress intended municipalities and local
governments to be included as a 'person' under Section 1983).
12 See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).
2001
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the four elements of the claim for relief first, and, later on, the
question of municipal liability.
A) DEPRIVATION OF A FEDERALLY PROTECTED RIGHT
One of the most important principles of Section 1983
litigation is that Section 1983 itself does not give the plaintiff any
rights; it does not create any rights; it does not establish any
rights.1 4 Section 1983 is the procedural vehicle that authorizes the
assertion of a claim based upon the deprivation of a federal right
created by some source of federal law other than Section 1983.15
That source of federal law is usually the Federal Constitution.' 6 In
some cases, it is a federal statute, but it must be a federal statute
other than Section 1983.
Paula claims that excessive force was used against her by
the police officer during the course of her arrest. Given her claim,
it is easy in Paula's case to identify the constitutional right at issue.
Paula's claim is based upon the Fourth Amendment.17
Consequently, she must show that the use of force by the police
officer was objectively unreasonable.'
8
13 Monell, 436 U.S. at 664 (holding that a local government may not be sued
under § 1983 based solely on the fact that an employee or agent of the local
government inflicted the injury. The government can, however, be held
responsible when the injury was inflicted through the execution of a government
policy or custom.). See also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115,
120 (1992) (separating the Section 1983 claim asserted against the municipality
into two issues: "(1) whether plaintiffs harm was caused by a constitutional
violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation").
14 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 393-94 (1989); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600,
617 (1979); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
'5 See Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 (holding "Section 1983 'is not itself a source
of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal
rights elsewhere conferred' (quoting Baker, 443 U.S. at 144 n.3).
16 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 273 (1985).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. ..
'8 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 n.5 (holding that, within the context of the
Fourth Amendment, the question in an excessive force case is "whether the
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FUNDAMENTALS OF SECTION 1983
It must be noted, however, that although it is easy to
identify the constitutional claim in Paula's case, in many cases it is
not easy to figure out what the constitutional violation is. In my
opinion, one of the great difficulties with Section 1983 litigation is
determining the basis of the constitutional claim. This difficulty
arises because Section 1983 incorporates all, or at least virtually
all, of the individual rights in the Federal Constitution and makes
them all potentially enforceable against defendants who acted
under color of state law.' 9 In many cases, Section 1983 complaints
allege facts that add up to conduct by governmental officials that
we might all agree is egregious in one respect or another. The
bottom line, however, is that egregious governmental conduct does
not always add up to a constitutional violation. In addition, it
seems to me that no matter how long and hard one studies Section
1983 law, some new claim or allegation of misconduct by
governmental officials always arises. Even for constitutional
scholars, it is often difficult to figure out whether a constitutional
violation exists because there is not always Supreme Court
decisional law on point.
B) CAUSATION
The second element, causation, encompasses a type of
proximate cause requirement that is built into Section 1983.20 I
refer to a "type" of proximate cause requirement because although
courts sometimes refer to the requirement as "proximate cause,"
courts also use other language, such as "causal connection.",21 In
addition, in municipal liability cases, other language like "direct
causal connection" or "affirmative link" may appear.22 One of the
19 Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 444-45 (1991)(although the respondents in
Higgins argued that "the 'prime focus' of § 1983 was to ensure 'a right of action
to enforce the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment . . .' the court stated
that the scope of § 1983 has never been construed so narrowly).
20 Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285. See also supra note 10.
21 id.
22 See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (requiring a
direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged
constitutional violation); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824-25 (1985)
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unsettled questions is whether the causation requirement in Section
1983 is intended to be the same proximate cause requirement that
exists with respect to common law torts, or whether the causation
requirement is different under Section 1983. This question has not
yet been resolved by the United States Supreme Court. The
differences in the way causation is characterized, from decision to
decision, might simply be attributed to the use of different
language by the Court. Still, it remains somewhat of an unsettled
question as to whether the causation requirement in Section 1983 is
intended to be precisely the same as the proximate cause
requirement that is used for common law tort cases.
The element of causation poses very sticky questions in
Section 1983 cases when there are multiple officials who may have
been involved in the constitutional violation. The Second Circuit's
decision in Townes v. City of New York2 3 illustrates the difficulties
that can exist when multiple officials may be involved in a
constitutional violation. The result in Townes is, perhaps,
controversial. The plaintiff, Townes, was a passenger in a taxi.24
The taxicab was stopped by a police officer, who searched Townes
and uncovered evidence of a crime.2 5 In the state court criminal
proceeding, Townes' attorney moved to suppress the evidence,
claiming that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 6 The
motion to suppress was denied, and Townes was convicted and
incarcerated. Subsequently, the Appellate Division, First
Department, overturned the conviction finding that the search
violated the Fourth Amendment, and the motion to suppress should
have been granted.28 So what did Townes do next? He brought
suit in federal court under Section 1983, claiming that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated.29  Here is where it gets
interesting. Townes did not seek damages for the unconstitutional
23 176 F.3d 138 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 964 (1999).




28 People v. Victor, 149 A.D.2d 363, 363-64; 540 N.Y.S.2d 670, 670 (1st
Dep't), aff'd as modified by 74 N.Y.2d 874, 547 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1989)
(defendant Lamont Victor aka Victor Townes, aka Victor Lamont).
29 Townes v. City of New York, No. 94 Civ. 2647, 1998 U.S Dist. LEXIS
2739, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1998), rev'd in part by 176 F.3d 138.
530. [Vol 17
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search itself, but sought damages for what he claimed was an
unconstitutional conviction and incarceration. 30  On appeal, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment, but held that there was a lack of sufficient
causation between the unconstitutional search, on the one hand,
and the conviction and incarceration, on the other.31 In describing
the lack of causation, the Second Circuit used the phrase "gross
disconnect" to say that the chain of causation between the stop and
the search and claimed unconstitutional conviction and sentence
was too remote.
32
There is another way to look at Townes' claim, however.
The state trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress,
which turned out to be an erroneous denial of the motion to
suppress, could be thought of as being an intervening cause that
was not reasonably foreseeable.33 In other words, the action by the
state criminal trial judge, in denying the motion to supress, was an
intervening cause that broke the chain of causation between
unconstitutional search and the conviction and incarceration.
34
One of the curiosities about the case is why the plaintiff did not
simply seek damages for the unconstitutional search. My
speculation would be that there may not have been much in terms
of damages resulting from the search itself, and that the real
damages occurred from the conviction and incarceration.
C) A "PERSON" WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 1983
The third element is that the defendant must be a "person"
within the meaning of Section 1983. 35  State and municipal
officials who are sued in their personal capacities are clearly
"persons" within the meaning of Section 1983 and they may be
30 Id. at *4.
31 Townes, 176 F.3d at 147.
32 Id. at 148.
33 Id. at 146-47.
34 Id. (holding it is well settled that the chain of causation between a police
officer's unlawful arrest and a subsequent conviction and incarceration is broken
by the intervening exercise of independent judgment).
5 Will v. Michigan Dep't of State of Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989);
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
2001
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sued under Section 1983.36 Municipalities and other municipal
entities are also considered "persons" within the meaning of
Section 1983 as a result of the Monel137 decision. If a plaintiff
chooses to sue a municipal official in the official's official
capacity, that is considered the same thing as suing the
municipality.38 If you think about it then, there is no reason to sue
a municipal official in his or her official capacity. The plaintiff
can simply name the municipality as a defendant. There are a
fairly large number of decisions holding that if the plaintiff names
both the municipality and a particular municipal official in that
official's official capacity as defendants, the official capacity claim
should be dismissed as redundant. 39 The official capacity claim is
redundant because it does not add anything to the litigation.
One interesting point to note here, which is not an
overwhelming point but worth mentioning in order to avoid
needless headaches, is that departments of municipalities, like
police departments and sheriffs departments, departments of
corrections, and commissions, are usually held to be not suable
entities. 40 They are not "persons" within the meaning of Section
1983. Since they are not suable entities, and are commonly
dismissed as party defendants, the plaintiffs lawyer should not
bother naming them as defendants, but should name the
municipality itself.
36 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
37 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
38 Id. at 691. See also Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165-66 (1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985).
39 See, e.g., Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25.
40 See, e.g., Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the sheriffs department was not a legal entity, and therefore not subject to
suit under § 1983); Orraca v. City of New York, 897 F. Supp. 148, 151-52
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that neither the police department or its precinct have
the authority to sue or be sued, and therefore the claims against these defendants
under § 1983 were dismissed); Marsden v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 856 F.
Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("a jail is not an entity that is amenable to
suit"); Skydiving Ctr. v. St. Mary's County Airport Comm'n, 823 F. Supp.
1273, 1280 (D. Md. 1993) (holding that only the Board of County
Commissioners, and not the Airport Commission, was a cognizable entity). See
also MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION:
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, 1A, 486-87.
[Vol 17532
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In attempting to sue a state or state agency under Section
1983, the plaintiff must take into account that states and state
agencies sued for monetary relief under Section 1983 are not
considered Section 1983 "persons., 41 The interpretation of the
word "person" under Section 1983 is thus in harmony with
Eleventh Amendment decisional law. 2  The plaintiff can,
however, get prospective relief against a state government by
naming the appropriate state official in his or her official
capacity.43 The plaintiff cannot sue the state or the state agency for
prospective relief, but the plaintiff is able to obtain prospective
relief against the responsible state official in his or her official
capacity.44
Sometimes the issue arises of whether a particular official
is a municipal official or a state policymaker. This can be a very
important question because a municipal official sued in his or her
official capacity would be the same as suit against a municipality.45
Municipalities are persons under Section 1983, and the Eleventh
Amendment does not protect them.46  If the plaintiff seeks
monetary relief when suing a state official in her official capacity,
that would be the same as suing the state.47 The state official sued
in his or her official capacity for money damages is not a Section
1983 person; therefore, in federal court, that claim would be barred
by the Eleventh Amendment.48 The way the state versus municipal
policymaker issue gets resolved is the same way that the issue
concerning so-called hybrid entities gets resolved.49 Courts run
4' See Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Howlett v. Rose, 469 U.S. 356, 365 (1990);
Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 108 (lst Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S.
1063 (1992); Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc. 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir.
1991); Manning v. Dep't of Hwy. & Pub. Safety, 914 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir.
1990).
42 See Edelinan v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Alabama v. Pugh, 438
U.S. 781, 782 (1978).
41 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
44 Pugh, 438 U.S. at 782.
45 McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 784-85 (1997); Brandon, 469
U.S. at 472.
46 Will, 491 U.S. at 70.47 Id. at 71.
48 Id.
49 Mount Healthy School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977) (holding
that a local school board is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the
2001
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through a wide variety of factors in making a determination on this
issue, such as: What type of function is the entity carrying out?
How does the state law characterize the entity? How much
supervision and control is there by state government?50 The most
critical question, however, is whether the judgment will be paid out
of state ftnds or municipal funds. If the judgment is likely to be
paid out of state funds, then the court is going to consider the entity
to be a state entity. If it is to be paid out of local funds, then the
court is very likely to consider the entity to be a local entity.
51
D) ACTION UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW
Assuming that we have a "person" who is suable under
Section 1983, the plaintiff must show that this person acted under
color of state law. 2 The easiest case for a finding of action under
color of state law is where the state or local official acted while
carrying out his or her official responsibilities in accordance and
compliance with state law. 53 Difficulty arises when the official
acts in violation of state law. If you think about it, Paula Plaintiff's
claim presents this type of issue. If she alleges that the officer used
excessive force, there is a good probability that the officer was
using force in violation of state law standards.
The key question here, and sometimes it is an easier
question to ask than to answer, is whether the official was using
state authority. Was the official acting pursuant to the power of
the state? Was the official using, albeit abusing, state authority?
An official who uses, but abuses, state authority by acting in
state, and therefore it is not entitled- to assert any Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suits in the federal courts).50 See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 781.
51 Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663 (holding a federal court award of damages against
a state, state agency, or state official sued in an official capacity, is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment); Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280 (where the court found
that the school district was not a state entity but rather a municipal corporation
and therefore not protected by the 11 th Amendment); Brandon, 469 U.S. at 471.52 FlaggBros., 436 U.S. at 155.
53 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (holding that it is firmly established
that a defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law when he abuses the
position given to him by the state).
[Vol 17
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violation of state law nevertheless is said to be acting under color
of state law?
54
As you go down the line, this issue gets tougher and
tougher. The next question to ask is: how are officials who use
state authority in violation of state law. defined? How do we
distinguish them from officials who may have been acting in a
purely private capacity? In the examples that come to mind, there
are two groups of cases where this is a recurrent issue. One
example is the school teacher abuse cases where public school
teachers abuse students. The question in those cases is whether the
teacher was acting as an individual, or alternatively, whether the
teacher was exercising, albeit abusing, state authority.
55
The other example is police officer cases - especially off-
duty police officer cases. Let us suppose that an off-duty police
officer, we will assume it is a male officer, is with his spouse.
Somebody approaches the couple and is rude to the officer's
spouse and the officer says something like, "Nobody treats my
wife that way." The officer then roughs up the intruder. Was the
police officer acting under color of state law? There is no magical
formula to answer that question. The best that courts have been
able to do is to look at all of the pertinent circumstances. 56 In my
example, we have an off-duty police officer. Is there an ordinance
in this jurisdiction that says that police officers are considered to
be on-duty at all times? That is a pertinent consideration.
However, even if there is such an ordinance, that does not mean
that everything this police officer does is under color of state law.
When the officer gets up in the morning and is rude to his children
54 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184 ("Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law." (quoting United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325-26 (1941)).
55 See, e.g., Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1407 (5th
Cir. 1995); Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 492-93 (10th Cir. 1995); Wilson v.
Webb, 869 F. Supp. 496, 497 (W.D. Ky. 1994), appeal granted 230 F.3d 1361
(2000), cert. denied sub nom Littrell v. Wilson, 532 U.S. 942 (2001).
56 See, e.g., Pickrel v. City of Springfield, 45 F.3d 1115 (7th Cir. 1995);
Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Tarpley, 945
F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1991); Bonsignore v. City of New York, 683 F.2d 635 (2d
Cir. 1982); Layne v. Sample, 627 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1980); Stengel v. Belcher,
522 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1975).
2001
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while having breakfast, he is not acting under color of state law.
All we can say is that an ordinance requiring the officer to be on
duty at all times is a pertinent factor. Did the police officer flash
his badge? Did he have his service revolver? Did he show his
service revolver? Did he say, "You know, I'm a police officer."
Did the officer who was defending his wife purport to make an
arrest? The answers to these questions are relevant, but none is
dispositive.
These are difficult questions for the courts because very
often what we have are a number of factors that favor a finding
that the officer did act under color of state law, and maybe a
number of other factors that point in the opposite direction. I
wonder whether, as some courts recently seem to be doing in this
type of situation, it makes sense to give this issue to the jury with
instructions about misuse of governmental authority. It may be
better to just tell the jury about the pertinent considerations they
may take into account, and then let the jury, as a fact-finder, do the
addition and subtraction to come to the conclusion of whether this
police officer on this occasion was or was not acting under color of
state law.
How about private companies or private individuals? They
will be found to have acted under color of state law only when they
are engaged in state action.57
III. THE IMMUINITY DEFENSES
Let us now look at the immunity defenses. My
hypothetical police officer here has been sued for damages in his
personal capacity. When there is a personal capacity claim against
a public official under Section 1983, that official is very likely to
raise an immunity defense. Common law immunities have been
read into Section 1983 by the United States Supreme Court.
58
Although there is nothing in Section 1983 itself that speaks to the
57 See, e.g., American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 52 (holding private
defendant will not be held to constitutional standards unless "there is a
sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity" so as to treat the private entity as if it is the State).
See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 28-29 (holding immunity from suit under Section
1983 is based on historical common law state interests).
[Vol 17
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question of immunity, the Supreme Court's position is that when
Congress adopted the original version of Section 1983 back in
1871, Congress intended that the common law immunities be
considered part of the Section 1983 cause of action.
59
A) ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
Some officials are entitled to absolute immunity. This is
the cat's pajamas of immunity because absolute means absolute.
Even if the official acted in bad faith or with malice, and even if
the official violated clear federal law, the official will be protected
from personal liability if she has absolute immunity.61  So the
question becomes: who are these lucky souls? They are mainly
62judges, prosecutors, legislative officials, and witnesses. 62 When
Burt Newborn lectured on the subject of immunities at this
program many years ago, he was very fond of saying, "It is not
surprising that judges have absolute immunity, because after all,
these are common law immunities and judges created the common
law." I remember him suggesting that if dentists had been put in
charge of immunities, we probably would have absolute dental
immunity, and maybe not absolute judicial immunity.
I suppose that, given the number of judges who were
formerly prosecutors, it is also not surprising that prosecutors have
absolute immunity. As for legislators, members of the judiciary
know that they do not get paid unless they are in the legislative
budget. So it probably makes perfect sense that legislative
officials should have absolute immunity as well. Most officials,
however, and now we are talking about executive and
administrative officials, have a somewhat lesser immunity we call
59 Id. (stating that immunity from suit under § 1983 is "predicated upon a
considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official
at common law and the interests behind it. . ." (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 421 (1976))).
60 Id. at 29 (stating "this Court has refused to extend absolute immuity beyond
a very limited class of officials, including the President of the United States,
Legislators carrying out their legislative functions, and judges carrying out their
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qualified immunity. 63  Qualified immunity will protect them as
long as they do not violate clearly established federal law.64 •
Whether an official is entitled to assert absolute immunity
or qualified immunity depends upon the particular function that the
official carried out. It does not depend upon the title that the
65official possesses. In making their determinations, courts take a
functional approach, which means that an official may have
absolute immunity for carrying out one function, and qualified
immunity for carrying out a different function. 66 For example,
judges would have absolute immunity for carrying out the judicial
function for engaging in the process of adjudicating cases, but
when judges make hiring and firing decisions, they are carrying
out an executive or administrative function for which they can
claim only qualified immunity.
67
This functional approach can raise some difficult questions.
For example, prosecutors get absolute immunity when they carry
out their advocacy functions in making decisions about whether to
prosecute and how to prosecute and prepare for prosecution, but
prosecutors can only claim qualified immunity with respect to their
administrative and investigatory functions. 68 The Supreme Court's
position is that if a prosecutor chooses to act like a detective, and
participates, for example, in the search or arrest of a defendant,
then we are going to treat that prosecutor like a detective and only
allow the prosecutor to claim qualified immunity.69  There are
some very close calls in these cases as to which side of the line the
prosecutor's activity falls - the investigatory line on one hand, or
the prosecutorial line on the other.7 °
63 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (stating that, for
executive officials in general, qualified immunity represents the norm).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 811 (holding that in general, the cases have followed a functional
apY6roach).
See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988).
67 Id. at 228 (holding that even though administrative decisions may be
essential to the very functioning of the courts, they have not been regarded as
judicial acts).
68 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976); Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269-71 (1993).
69 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273.
70 See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129-31 (1997).
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Sometimes there are tough questions in the land use area
concerning municipal officials who make decisions regarding the
permissible use of property.71  Are they acting as legislative
officials who make policy, or are they merely enforcing policy?
We can articulate these distinctions, which go back to the
separation of power, as the distinction between legislating and
making policy, and enforcing policy. But when you try to apply
the distinction to a particular case, such as where a zoning board
refuses to rezone, whether it is a legislative function or an
executive function is not always obvious. If the zoning board held
a hearing it may even come down to a question of whether it was a
quasi-judicial function.
B) QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Other than the question of whether the plaintiff has been
able to establish a violation of a federally protected right, this is the
most critical issue in Section 1983 litigation. In Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court attempted to simplify qualified
immunity.72 Attempted, because qualified immunity continues to
be nothing short of a nightmare. The court attempted to simplify
qualified immunity by turning the qualified immunity defense into
a legal issue that could be determined as a matter of law by federal
district court judges early in the litigation.73 The idea was that
qualified immunity would be a test of objective reasonableness, of
whether the official acted in an objectively reasonable fashion.
The test would determine whether the official acted in such a
fashion by asking the Tuestion: did this official violate clearly
established federal law?7 Officials who act in violation of clearly
established federal law are considered officials who did not act in
an objectively reasonable fashion and are, therefore, not protected
by qualified immunity. On the other hand, officials who violate
71 Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 278 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that if
legislators of any political subdivision of a state function in a legislative
capacity, they are absolutely immune from being sued under the provisions of
§ 1983).72Harlow, 457 U.S. at 800.
73 Id. at 815. See, also, Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
74 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.
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federal law, but not clearly established federal law, are viewed as
having acted in an objectively reasonable fashion and, therefore,
would be protected from personal liability by the qualified
immunity defense.
75
A useful way to look at this is set forth in the 1997 decision
in United States v. Lanier,76 where the Supreme Court described
qualified immunity as a type of fair warning standard.77 It is a way
of saying to public officials, "If the federal law is clearly
established, then you are on notice that you are expected to comply
with that federal law, and you are on further notice that if you do
not comply with the clearly established federal law, you can be
held personally liable for damages." By contrast, if the federal law
is not clearly established, then the official is not given fair notice
or fair warning as to what that law is, and a violation of federal law
will not lead to the imposition of personal liability.
78
The Supreme Court's attempt to simplify qualified
immunity was designed to allow federal district court judges to
make this immunity determination as early in the litigation as
possible.79 It was hoped that, wherever possible, pretrial or even
pre-discovery immunity determinations would be made by the
court as a matter of law. 80 In my opinion this has not worked very
well because, in a high percentage of the cases, the relevant facts
are in sharp controversy. The plaintiff has one version of the facts
and the defendant has another. You cannot figure out what the
governing law is until you resolve the facts, no less determine
whether the law was clearly established.81
The Supreme Court's goal in having this immunity
determination made early on in the litigation was to give public
officials not only an immunity from liability, but what the Supreme
75 Id. See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644 (1987).
76 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
77 Id. at 265-66; see also Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1963)
(stating that no man should be held responsible for conduct that he could not
reasonably understand was proscribed).
78 Id. at 270. See also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156
(2001) (holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violated that right).79 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815; see also Hunter, 502 U.S. at 235.80 Hunter, 502 U.S. at 225.
81 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998).
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Court calls, "an immunity from suit." 2 The Court gave officials an
immunity from the burden of even having to defend the
litigation.83 The Supreme Court has reiterated this point several
times, and it is established law.84  This is, however, a fairly
extraordinary concept. Plaintiffs' civil rights lawyers all
understood from day one that they had to overcome immunity
defenses in order to establish liability, but the idea that an
immunity defense protects the defendant from even having to
defend the case was really an extraordinary and radical idea.
Not only was this a new concept, but the Supreme Court
took it one step further to insure that public officials could
vindicate their immunity from suit. The Court held that where the
district judge denies an assertion of qualified immunity that was
raised either on a motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment, the official may take an immediate appeal to the circuit
court.8 5 The only proviso is that the immunity appeal must be
couched in legal terms.8 6  In other words, the appeal must be
couched so that the circuit court could resolve the immunity issue
as a matter of law. But defendants are always capable of
presenting the immunity issue to the circuit court as a matter of law
by simply saying, "the immunity issue may be resolved in
defendant's favor based upon the factual allegations in the
plaintiff's complaint ....." Once a defendant says that, the
immunity issue is presented to the circuit court as a matter of law.
Defendants are not always willing to do that, however, and there
are frequently tough battles on appeal as to whether the immunity
appeal presents a question of fact or a question of law. Sometimes
82 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982))(stating "Harlow... recognized an entitlement not to
stand trial or face the other burden of litigation, conditioned on the resolution of
the ... question whether the conduct of which the plaintiff complains violated
clearly established law." This entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to liability.).
83 Mitchell, 472 U.S.at 526.
84 See Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2155-56.
85 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527 (holding "an appreciable interlocutory decision
must conclusively determine the disputed question and that question must
involve a claim of right seperable from, and collateral to rights asserted in the
action."). See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978);
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).86Id. at 550. See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995).
2001
17
Schwartz: Fundamentals of Section 1983
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2001
TOURO LAWREVIEW
these immunity appeals present both questions of fact and
questions of law. In those cases the circuit court has jurisdiction
over the legal part of the appeal, but no jurisdiction over the factual
part of the appeal.87 So I come back to my" astonishment at the
Supreme Court's attempt to simplify qualified immunity. One
only has to try to read some of these circuit court decisions and try
to figure out whether the immunity appeal presents a question of
fact or a question of law to know that simplification has not
worked.
If I were a plaintiffs attorney, I would place great
importance on the availability of interlocutory immunity appeals.
These appeals are costly in terms of legal resources for plaintiffs'
lawyers and the delay of litigation, because when an immunity
appeal is taken, district court proceedings are stayed. Thus, the
delay is usually a negative for the plaintiff, while governmental
defendant's are normally quite happy to maintain the statuts quo.
C) FOUR MAIN QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ISSUES
I have picked out four qualified immunity issues for
discussion. These are the big issues litigators have to deal with.
i. Qualified Immunity or Violation of Federally Protected
Rights?
The first issue is: When a qualified immunity defense is
raised, what should the court deal with first? Should the court go
right to the qualified immunity defense, or should it first ask the
question of whether the complaint states a violation of a federally
protected right. This could be an important issue in terms of the
practicality of litigation. Attorneys like to know the answer to this
question in order to know how to frame their briefs and present
their oral arguments.
Back in 1991, Siegert v. Gilley88 seemed to definitively
hold that the first question a court should confront when faced with
17 See, e.g., Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 255-56
(2001).
88 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
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a qualified immunity defense is whether the complaint states a
violation of federally protected rights. 89 The idea was that, if the
complaint does not state a violation of federally protected rights,
that should be the end of the matter. There would be no need to
deal with the qualified immunity defense. Post Siegert, the
Supreme Court itself did not always adhere to the Siegert
approach. 90 Naturally, that created some questions among lower
court judges.
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis,91 in a lengthy footnote,
the Supreme Court said, "the better approach" is for courts to first
ask whether the complaint states a violation of federally protected
rights.92 The Court reasoned that, if courts routinely went to the
qualified immunity defense first, it would become difficult for
constitutional standards to get resolved. 93  That is a fairly
important point. How would constitutional issues get resolved if
courts routinely decided cases on the basis of qualified immunity?
Of course, the phrase "better approach" was unclear.
The next year, 1999, the Court decided two cases, Conn v.
Gabbert94 and Wilson v. Layne.95 In those cases the former "better
approach" language shifted to "must" language. The Court said
that when qualified immunity is asserted as a defense, courts must
first resolve whether the complaint states a violation of federally
protected rights. 96 The Court did something here we would not
accept from most law students though. The Court did not say
whether this new "must" approach was intended to overturn the
prior "better approach." So there is still some uncertainty, but
there is a clear message that having the lower courts first deal with
the question of whether the complaint states a violation of federally
protected rights is at least the preferred approach.
'9 Id. at 232.
90 See, e.g., Hunter, 502 U.S. at 224.
9' 523 U.S. 833 (1998).92 Id. at 842 n 5.
93 Id. at 842.
9' 526 U.S. 286 (1999).
9' 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
96 Id. at 609; accord Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2156 (stating that the threshhold
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Yet, despite strong messages from the Supreme Court,
some lower court judges have been resistant and have sought to go
first to the qualified immunity defense.97  This is somewhat
understandable. If you have a :case that presents a difficult
question of constitutional law, and there is a qualified immunity
defense raised, then it might be appealing for a lower court to say,
"I do not have to resolve this complex, unsettled question of
constitutional law. All I have to hold is that regardless of what the
constitutional law might be, it was not clearly established at the
time the official acted."
ii. Clearly Established Federal Law
The second qualified immunity issue is: What do we mean
by clearly established federal law? What precedent makes the law
clearly established? The kev decision here from the Supreme
Court is Wilson v. Layne, where the Supreme Court said,
normally, for the federal law to be considered clearly established,
there must be controlling precedent either from the United States
Supreme Court, the particular circuit, or the highest court in the
state. 99 That is what normally will establish federal law. Another
component should be added to that, however. There must also be a
close factual correspondence between the facts in the case at hand
and the facts in the precedent that the plaintiff is relying upon.
00
Close factual correspondence is not the same as identical factual
correspondence. That would be an unreasonable requirement to
impose upon the plaintiff. But once we say close factual
correspondence, predictably, judges are going to disagree, to some
extent, as to how close that factual correspondence must be.
Decisions from outside the controlling jurisdiction, such as
a decision from another circuit, -or a decision from another state
court, normally will not clearly establish federal law, absent a
strong consensus of opinion in lower court decisions in other
97 See, e.g., Home v. Coughlin, 178 F.3d 603, 603 (2d Cir.), denying reh 'g of
155 F.3d 26 (2d Cir.), adhered to on reh "g, 191 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1052 (1999).
9' 526 U.S. at 603.
99 Id. at 616-17.
1oo Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2156; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40.
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jurisdictions.' 0' A conflict in the circuits is a strong indicator that
federal law was not clearly established, and courts can look at the
strength of the government's argument in support of the
constitutionality of the governmental practice.102 Therefore, there
may be cases where the ultimate conclusion is that the official
acted in an unconstitutional manner, but the court might go on to
conclude that the consitutional arguments put forth by the official
had some substance to them. In that case, the likelihood is that the
law will not be found to be clearly established.
iii. Standards of Objective Reasonableness
The third qualified immunity issue is: how does qualified
immunity apply when the constitutional standard itself is one 'of
objective reasonableness? The bottom line answer, at best, is it
applies awkwardly. Qualified immunity itself is an objectively
reasonable standard. This comes up on a recurring basis in
challenges to arrests and challenges to searches. Of course, the
key standard in those Fourth Amendment challenges is whether the
officer had probable cause.
103
Probable cause itself is an objective reasonableness test. In
Paula Plaintiff's case, her excessive force, Fourth Amendment
claim depends upon whether the officer acted in an objectively
reasonable fashion. 104 In these cases, the application of qualified
immunity as an objective reasonableness test might appear to be
redundant because the constitutional claim already requires a
showing that the officer acted in an objectively reasonable fashion.
Qualified immunity applies even when the Fourth
Amendment standard itself is one of objective reasonableness.
10 5
That means the official is given two levels of reasonableness
protection: one level of protection under the Fourth Amendment;
another level of protection under qualified immunity. In Anderson
'0' Wilson, 526 U.S. at 616.
10 2 Id. at 618.
1O3 Malley, 495 U.S. at 341 (stating that if there is a lack of probable cause in
obtaining an arrest warrant, there would be no immunity from suit under Section
1983).
104 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
1o5 Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2156; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
2001
21
Schwartz: Fundamentals of Section 1983
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2001
TOURO LAW REVIEW
v. Creighton,0 6 which dealt with a challenge to a warrantless
search made by federal law enforcement officers, the Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment claim was subject to the
qualified immunity defense even though the Fourth Amendment
standard itself was an objectively reasonable standard.1 °7
Is it possible for a public official to act in an unreasonable
manner for Fourth Amendment purposes and yet to be held to have
acted in a reasonable fashion for qualified immunity purposes?
Well, in Anderson, the Supreme Court said that is a possibility.
10 8
It is another way of saying that an official could be found to have
acted in an unreasonable manner for constitutional purposes, but in
a reasonable manner for qualified immunity purposes. An official
can act reasonably unreasonably. It gets the mind spinning at some
point.
It may be less awkward, at least semantically, to conclude
that the officer had arguable probable cause. That is one way
lower courts have gotten out of the semantic difficulty. There are
many, many cases where the court finds a Fourth Amendment
violation because the officer lacked probable cause, but the officer
is protected from personal liability by qualified immunity because
the officer had arguable probable cause. 109 That shows the potency
of the defense of qualified immunity.
iv. Facts in Dispute
The fourth qualified immunity issue is: how does qualified
immunity get resolved when facts that are relevant to the qualified
immunity defense are in dispute? Who should decide the factual
issues, the judge or the jury? One possibility, of course, is that the
trial judge could say, "Let the jury decide the disputed factual
questions on special verdicts, -and let the judge reserve the
qualified immunity defense for the court, to be resolved on the
'06 483 U.S. at 635.
107 Id. at 645.
108 Id. at 641 (holding "it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in
some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present..
. and in those cases those officials like other officials who act in ways they
reasonably believe to be lawful should not be held personally liable.").
109 See, e.g., Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227.
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basis of what the judge finds to be the clearly established federal
law, along with the facts that the jury has found." An alternative
system would give the qualified immunity issue itself to the jury
under instructions which would explain the nature of the qualified
immunity defense and also tell the jury what the clearly established
federal law was. The court would never ask the jury to decide
whether the federal law was clearly established or not, as that is
clearly a question of law for the court.
Qualified immunity is a very, very potent defense. Defense
attorneys understand how important and how powerful it is.
Plaintiffs lawyers, by my observation, very often underestimate
how significant and how powerful this defense is. It may not be
absolute immunity, but it is just a rung below and maybe it is not a
big rung below. A very large percentage of Section 1983 cases get
resolved in favor of the defendants based upon qualified immunity.
V. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
Municipal liability is the last issue I want to address.
Because there is no respondeat superior liability under Section
1983, in order to establish municipal liability the plaintiff has to
show that, in some way, the violation of her federally protected
rights was attributable to the enforcement of a municipal policy or
practice. 110 Municipal entities, unlike public officials, cannot
assert the official's common law immunities, so that, even if the
municipal official is protected by an absolute immunity or
qualified immunity because the official acted in an objectively
reasonable manner, the municipality is still potentially subject to
Section 1983 liability. This is one of the main reasons that Section
1983 plaintiffs often couple their personal liability claims with
municipal liability claims. The other big reason is to get to the
deeper pocket municipal entity.
While Section 1983 complaints commonly assert claims
against municipal entities, Section 1983 plaintiffs very often have
great difficulties establishing municipal liability. The reason for
that is, if one looks at the different potential bases for establishing
"o Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
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municipal liability, one finds difficult problems for Section 1983
plaintiffs.
One possibility would be for the plaintiff to rely upon a
formally promulgated policy by the municipality, for example, by
the city council. The problem is that the formally promulgated
policy is often not there. For instance, in police misconduct cases,
municipalities typically do not have policies that allow police
officers to use unreasonable force, to brutalize individuals, or to
make arrests without probable cause. A formally promulgated
policy is a potential basis of municipal liability, but it is not found
in many cases. It is just not there.
The second possibility is for the plaintiff to be able to show
a custom or practice. This custom or practice could be a custom or
practice of the higher echelon municipal officials, the policy
makers. Alternatively, it could be a practice by lower echelon
employees, which, if sufficiently pervasive, gives the higher ups
actual, or at least constructive, knowledge as to what is taking
place. Although the law recognizes custom or practice as a basis
for municipal liability,"'I sufficient evidence to establish the claim
is often lacking. These claims are very difficult to prove. It is also
very time consuming to find that kind of evidence, requiring a lot
of investigation and discovery. The number of plaintiffs who are
able to actually prove a municipal custom or practice is quite few
in number.
The third possibility is a final decision by a municipal
policy maker. This is a possibility, but again, very often, the
wrong that the plaintiff is complaining about was not a wrong of a
final policy maker of the municipality. Very often, it was the
police officer on the beat, or some subordinate employee that
engaged in conduct that violated the plaintiff's rights.
The Supreme Court says that who has final policy making
authority is a question of state law. 112 In reality, it is more often a
question of local law. That means that plaintiffs have to look at
ordinances and municipal policy statements, and possibly
regulations. A little practical suggestion here is that, when this
issue does occur, the attorneys should furnish the materials to the
111 Id.
112 See St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988); Pembaur v.
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986).
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court because those materials are not likely to be readily available
in a federal court library. Once the materials are furnished to the
court, they can be judicially noticed.
There is also a question of whether an official is a state
policy maker, as compared to a municipal policy maker." 3 This is
a very important question because, if the official is found to be a
state policy maker, then that official's decisions do not become the
basis for establishing municipal liability. 14  For example, in a
series of decisions from the Second Circuit dealing with the
functions of New York's prosecutors, the court has held that a
prosecutor is considered to be a state policy maker acting on behalf
of the State of New York as far as the decision to prosecute, and in
actually prosecuting the case." 5 For other functions, however,
such as how the prosecutor's office gets administered, or the
training of assistant district attorneys, the prosecutor is considered
to be a municipal official."
16
Finally, Supreme Court decisional law establishes that a
plaintiff can base a claim of municipal liability on alleged
inadequate training. 7  The plaintiff has to show not just
113 See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785 (where the issue was whether Alabama
sheriffs are policymakers for the state or for the county when they act in a law
enforcement capacity).
114id.
115 Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1014
(1989).
116 Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 735 (1995).
117 See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 (holding "the inadequacy of police
training may serve as a basis for 1983 liability only where the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police
come into contact."); Bd. of the County Comm'rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409
(1997) (holding it is possible "that evidence of a single violation of Federal
rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to train its
employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for
such violation, could trigger municipal liability); Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484
(where the trial judge instructed the jury that a single, unusually excessive use of
force may warrant an inference that it was attributable to grossly inadequate
training, and that the municipality could be held liable on that basis); Oklahoma
City, 471 U.S. at 820-21 (the District Court charged the jury "that the city's
policymakers could not merely have been negligent in establishing training
policies, but they must have been guilty of gross negligence or deliberate
indifference to the polcie misconduct...").
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inadequate training in a vacuum, but a specific training
deficiency.11 8 The plaintiff also has to show that the municipality
was deliberately indifferent with respect to that training
deficiency. 1 9 It is often very difficult for the plaintiff to establish
that deliberately indifferent training by the municipality was the
cause, was proximately or directly linked to, the violation of the
plaintiffs federally protected rights. My observation is that
although these claims are asserted fairly routinely, relatively few
succeed. It is a tiny fraction. I would be surprised if it was much
more than one percent of the claims.
The Supreme Court has used the deliberate indifference
standard in municipal liability claims for inadequate training, and
for claims of deficient hiring.' 20 The lower courts have extended
the deliberate indifference standard to claims of inadequate
supervision. 121  The open question is whether the deliberate
indifference standard for municipal liability claims also applies in
cases where the plaintiffs claim is based upon a municipal policy
that is facially constitutional, but the plaintiff alleges that the
policy was the cause of the violation of her federally protected
rights. The question is whether the deliberate indifference standard
applies in that situation. The lower courts tend to take Supreme
Court deliberate indifference liability decisions and apply
deliberate indifference across the board.122 It is not clear, however,
whether that is what the United States Supreme Court intended.
118 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 n.7.
" 9 Id. at 389.
120 Bd of the County Comm 'rs, 520 U.S. at 407.
121 Young v. County of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1998).
122 See, e.g., Trigalet v. Tulsa, 239 F.3d 1151, 1153 (10th Cir. 2001); Young v.
City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 574 (4th Cir. 2001); Newburgh Enlarged Sch.
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